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Abstract : This paper discusses how a measure of 
uncertainty representing a state of knowledge can be 
updated when a new information, which may be 
pervaded with uncertainty, becomes available. This 
problem is considered in various framework, namely : 
Shafer's evidence theory, Zadeh's possibility theory, 
Spohn's updating approach. In the two first cases, 
analogues of Jeffrey's rule of conditioning are 
introduced and discussed. The relations between 
Spohn's model and possibility theory are emphasized 
and Spohn's updating rule is contrasted with the 
Jeffrey-like rule of conditioning in possibility theory. 
1 • Belief updating in an uncertain 
environment 
One of the strong assets of probability theory for 
reasoning with uncertain information is the existence 
of Bayes rule of conditioning that serves as a basis for 
an efficient theory of belief updating. This feature is 
apparently missing in alternative theories of 
uncertainty such as belief functions and possibility 
theory, despite the existence of conditioning notions 
that are more and more discussed currently. Especially 
whether Dempster rule and other symmetric 
combination rules can serve as a substitute to 
Bayesian inference is debatable. In this paper we make 
a step toward addressing these problems by proposing 
alternative updating rules that extend the notion of 
conditioning while preserving the intrinsic 
dissymmetry of the process of updating k nowledge 
bases. 
Here knowledge bases are considered from a 
semantic point of view. This means that their 
contents are supposed to be represented by a unique 
weight distribution on a suitable universe, in a given 
uncertainty modeling framework. In the following, 
Shafer (1976)'s basic probability assignments, Zadeh 
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(1978)'s possibility distributions, Spohn ( 1988, 
1989)'s ordinal conditional functions are the various 
candidates considered for the representation of the 
contents of a knowledge base. Thus when discussing 
updating issues, we do not take into account the 
existence of syntactically different knowledge bases 
having the same semantic description of their 
contents. The syntactic view would enable us to take 
care of the origin of each piece of information in a 
revision process. For instance let us consider the 
simple case of two knowledge bases (not pervaded 
with uncertainty) {A, A�B) and {A,B) which are 
semantically equivalent since they have the same set 
of consequences, namely the consequences of A A B ; 
then we may be led to revising them in different ways 
when receiving the new information -.A. Although 
more simple, the semantic view raises problems 
which are the topic of this paper. Indeed, most of the 
available combination rules (e.g. Dempster's rule, 
Zadeh's min-combination) are symmetrical ; thus if 
we use them f or combining the distribution 
expressing the contents of the whole knowledge base 
with the one representing the new information, we 
consider the old and the new information at the same 
level, which is debatable. 
The next two sections discuss conditionalization 
operations for updating purposes in Shafer's evidence 
theory and Zadeh's possibility theory respectively. 
These operations are not symmetrical and can be 
regarded as analogues of Jeffrey (1965)'s rule in 
probability theory. Then it is shown that Spohn's 
ordinal conditional functions are equivalent to 
possibility distributions and then conditionalization 
operations introduced by Spohn can be compared to 
the ones studied in the two other frameworks (since 
mathematically speaking, possibility measures can be 
regarded as particular cases of Shafer's plausibility 
functions). 
2 • Updating in Shafer's evidence theory 
In probability theory, conditioning is defmed by 
Bayes' formula 
P(B I A) = P(A n B) (1) 
P(A) 
where P( · ) denotes the prior probability, A is 
observed (with complete certainty) and P( · I A) 
denotes the a posteriori probability measure, taking A 
for granted. A and B are supposed to be subsets of a 
referential set 0. 
Jeffrey (1965)'s rule extends Bayes' conditioning to 
the case where the observation is pervaded with 
uncertainty. Let a be the (probabilistic) certainty with 
which A is observed, and thus 1 - a corresponds to 
the certainty that A is actually observed. Then the 
updated probability measure P' is defmed � 
P'(B) =a· P(B I A)+ (1 -a) · P(B I A) (2) 
where P(B I A) and P(B I A) are given by (1). This 
expression is generalized to the case where the 
possible observations A 1 , ... , An make a partition, 
and where ai is the certainty of having observed At. 
(with 2;=1,n ai = 1), by 
P'(B) = Li=l,n ai · P(B IAi) (3) 
In his book Pearl (1988) tries to cast this rule within 
the classical Bayesian framework, noticing that ai 
could be interpreted as a conditional probability 
P(AiiE) where E denotes the event producing an 
uncertain observation. Then P'(B) is of the form 
P(BIE) provided that E and B are conditionally 
independent given Ai, for all i. See Shafer (1981) for 
a comparison with Dempster's rule of combination. 
Nevertheless let us recall that the linear convex 
com b ination i s  the unique way of combining 
probability measures in an eventwise manner (the 
same combination law applies for each event) which 
leads to a probability measure as a result (Lehrer & 
Wagner, 1981 ; Berenstein et al., 1986). "Thus the 
expression {3), whatever its other justifications, is not 
at all surprising. 
Lastly note that if n = {ro1, ... , roml and Aj = 
{roi}, 'V i = l,m, ai = P2({roi}) for a probability 
measure P2, then Jeffrey's rule (3) comes down to a 
simple substitution of the prior probability P by the 
uncertain observation P2, i.e. P'(B) = P2(B), 'VB, 
since P(B I { ro i}) = 1 if ro i e B, and 0 otherwise. 
Let us now consider Shafer's evidence theory. In 
this framework the available knowledge is represented 
in terms of a basic probability assignment m, which 
is a set function from the set of subsets 2° of a so­
called frame of discernment n to [0,1] w ith the 
constraints m(0) = 0 and LA m(A) = 1. The subsets 
A � n such that m(A) > 0 are called focal elements. 
Note that there is no constraint on the structure of the 
set ff of focal elements (here supposed finite and 
which does not make a partition in general). Let us 
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emphasize that the pair (ff ,m) can be viewed as a 
random set (Goodman & Nguyen, 1985 ; Dubois & 
Prade, 1986a). This means that each focal element Ai 
represents the most accurate description of the reality 
with certainty m(Ai). The subsets Ai are the possible 
realizations of the observation pervaded w ith 
uncertainty. Due to the incompleteness of the 
available information, Ai is not necessarily a 
singleton. A plausibility function PI as well as a 
belief function Bel can be bijectively associated with 
m (Shafer, 1976) and are defmed by 
Pl(B) = LA:AnB� m(A) (4) 
Bel(B) = 1 - PlcB) = L0;eA�B m(A) (5) 
In terms of plausibility functions, Dempster rule of 
conditioning is expressed by 
Pl(B lA) = Pl(A n B) ; Bel(B I A) = 1 - PlcB I A) (6) 
Pl(A) 
This rule of conditioning can be justified on the basis 
of an axiom that defines a conditional function 
associated to any set-function f defined on n as 
follows (Cox, 1946): 
f(A n B) = f(A I B) • f(B) (7) 
which expresses that the degree attached to A n B is a 
function • of the degree attached to B combined with 
the degree attached to A, given that B is taken for 
�ted. It is well known that the Boolean structure of 
20 forces • to be a product up to an isomorphic 
transformation, when • is strictly monotonic in both 
places (e.g. Cox, 1946 ; Aczel, 1966). Note that (7) 
justifies Dempster's conditioning rule as well as the 
geometric rule of conditioning (Suppes & Zanotti, 
1977) 
Belg(A I B)=Bel(A n B)· Plg(A I B)=l-Belg(A I B) (8) 
Bel (B) 
In terms of basic probability assignments, PI( · I B) 
defmed by (6) is obtained by transferring all masses 
m(A) over to A n B, followed by a normalization 
step, while Belg( · I B) is obtained by letting 
m8(A I B) = m(AJ if A� B and 0 otherwise, followed 
by normalization, i.e. a more drastic way of 
conditioning (see Dubois & Prade, 1986b). 
Dempster's rule of conditioning looks more attractive 
from the point of view of updating since Pl(A I B) is 
undefined only if Pl(B) = 0 (i.e. B is impossible) 
while Belg(A I B) is undefined as soon as Bel(B) = 0 
(i.e. B is unknown). This unability to update with a 
vacuous prior is very counterintuitive, with the 
geometric rule. 
Another approach to conditioning has been 
proposed by De Campos et al. (1989) and Fagin & 
Halpern (1989) under the form 
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P*(A I B) = __ ..:..P:..::: l(A�f'I_;B:....::)=-­
Pl(A n B) + Bel( A n B) 
P��<(A I B)= Bel(A n B) 
Bel(A n B)+ Pl(A n B) 
(9) 
(10) 
These definitions are justified by interpreting belief 
and plausibility functions as lower and upper 
probabilities, since it has been proved that 
P*(A I B)= sup{P(A I B) I P e �(Bel)} (11) 
P��<(A I B)= inf{P(A I B) I P e �(Bel)} (12) 
where £P(Bel) = {P I Bel(A) ::;:; P(A) ::;:; Pl(A), '\1 A}. 
These conditional functions are actually upper and 
lower conditional probabilities and have been 
considered by Dempster himself. A lthough very 
satisfying from a probabilistic point of view, these 
defmitions lead to a rather uninformative conditioning 
process since P*( · I B) � Pl( · I B) � Bel( · I B) � 
P.(  · I B). Especially, complete ignorance is 
obtained (P*(A I B)= 1, P.(A I B)= 0) as soon as 
Bel(A n B)= 0 and Bel(A n B) = 0, i.e. as soon as 
the conditioning set B refines the granularity of the 
prior evidence by producing smaller focal elements. In 
that case the updating process corresponds to oblivion 
rather than learning. 
Although difficult to justify from the point of 
view of upper and lower probability, Dempster rule of 
conditioning is more informative (increasing the 
precision of focal elements is permitted). Moreover 
this rule can be viewed as the intersection of the 
random set underlying Bel, and the conditioning set, 
i.e. it is completely justified from the standpoint of 
random sets and corresponds to a conjunctive set­
theoretic operation. Then normalization is justified if 
the conditioning set must be taken for granted. Note 
that from the point of view of belief functions, the 
upper-lower probability view makes no sense just 
because belief functions are supposed to reflect a 
degree of certainty that uses a convention differing 
from probability functions (Bel{A) = 1 means 
certainty, Bel(A) = 0 means uncertainty) and that is 
not viewed as a lower probability (although from a 
mathematical point of view it is so). This point, i.e. 
that any set function can be used to represent certainty 
(up to further foundational issues) without referring to 
an unreachable probability function has often been 
overlooked by belief function opponents. Belief 
functions can be used as a model for evaluating 
certainty (this view is advocated by Smets (1988)) or 
as a model for capturing imprecision in probability 
(this view is that of Fagin & Halpern (1989), among 
others). Adopting the first point of view, Dempster 
rule of conditioning can be justified from a set of 
intuitive axioms (e.g. Cox conditioning axioms 
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(Dubois & Prade, 1988b) or, the approach by Smets 
(1988)) that never uses the set of probabilities 
underlying the mathematical model of the belief 
functions. 
Dempster rule of combination can be defined as a 
normalized intersection of two independent random 
sets (ff 1 ,m 1) and (ff 2•mz) 
m(B)=[m 1 ESmz](B )='LA tr'�Az=B m 1 (A 1) . mz(A 2.) (
13) 
lA1nAz;t0 mt<At) · mz(A2) 
This rule has been justified by Smets (1988, 1990) 
from axiomatic arguments. When the random set 
(ff 2•m2) associated with m2 reduces to the ordinary 
subset A, i.e. m2(A) = 1 and V A' :F. A, m2(A ') = 0, it 
can be easily checked that (13) and (4) give (6). Thus 
(13) extends (6) to the case of an uncertain 
observation represented by (ff 2.m2) , but in a 
symmetrical manner. This is unfortunate from an 
updating point of view. Indeed Dempster r ule 
embodies the combination of information from 
parallel sources that play the same role, while the 
notion of updating is basically dissymetrical : new 
information does not play the same role as a priori 
information. A non-symmetrical extension of (6) in 
case of uncertain observation, in the spirit of Jeffrey's 
rule (3), is provided by the formula 
Pl(B I (ff2.mz)) = LAd"l m2(A) · Pl1(B I A) (14) 
Pl1(A n B) where PI1 (B I A)= . The expression (14) PI1 (A) . 
can be interpreted in the following way : the subset A 
is the accurate description of what is observed with 
probability m2(A) and (14) is nothing but the 
expected plausibility of B given the uncertain 
observation. Formula (14) was suggested by Dubois 
& Prade (1986b; p. 140) up to a normalization factor 
and further discussed by lchihashi & Tanaka (1989) 
among different alternatives to Dempster's rule. (13) 
and (14) coincide when the normalization factor of 
Dempster rule is 1. 
The counterparts of ( 14 J in terms of functions m 
or Bel can be easily obtained since it can be checked 
that the convex combination Ii= 1 n ai · Pli with 
li=l,n ai = 1 corresponds to the plausibility function 
generated by the basic probability assignment l:.j= 1 ,n 
ai · mi and is the dual, in the sense of (5), of the 
belief function defined by Li=l,n ai · Be� (where 
Be�, as well as Pli is defined from mi). Thus we have 
m(B I (ff2.mz)) = LAd"l m2(A) · m1(B I A) (15) 
where 
m1(B I A)= (_l_) · �B=CnA rnt(C) (16) l>lt(A) 
is the normalized basic probability assignment 
associated with Pit ( · I A) (indeed LBO} m l (B I A) = 
1). In tenns of belief functions we have 
Bel(B I (fF"2,m2)) =LAO} m2(A) · Bell (B I A) (17) 
where 
Bel}(B 1 A)= Belt(B u A)· Bel1(A) (18) 
1- Bel1(A) 
It can be easily checked that (14) or (17) reduce to 
Jeffrey's rule when (ff l•m l) defines a probability 
measure (i.e. fF 1 only contains singletons of Q) and 
(fF 2,m2) is such that ff 2 is a partition of n. Wagner 
(1989) has recently established that the only 
eventwise combination of plausibility (or belief 
functions) is the linear convex combination, as it is 
the case for probability measures. This is a fonnal 
justification for (14) or (17), since as soon as we have 
in mind the random set view of a basic probability 
assignment, it is natural to require that the 
(plausibility or belief) function conditionalized by a 
random event depends only on the different conditional 
functions induced by the different realizations of this 
event. 
It is important to point out that conditioning is 
meaningful only when observa tion does not 
completely contradict a priori knowledge. This is the 
case for Bayes rule where P(B I A) is defined only if 
P(A) > 0 or for Dempster rule of conditioning where 
Pl(B I A) is defined only if Pl(A) > 0. This is still the 
case for Jeffrey's rule where in (3) we should have 
P(A·) > 0 as soon as ai > 0, as well as for its 
exte�ded version (8) which is defined only if V' A, 
m2(A) > 0, 3C, m 1(C) > 0 and A (i C * 0 (i .e. 
P11(A) > 0). Note �h.
at �em�s�er 's. rule of combination is less reqwnng smce It JS still defined 
when 3A, m2(A) > 0 and Pl1(A) = 0 (provided that it 
is not blle for all A) ; it may seem a bit disturbing 
since it allows that the new information states, as 
somewhat probable, something which was held as 
certainly false according to previous infonnation. We 
now examine the difference in behaviour of 
Dempster's rule of combination and of the extended 
Jeffrey's rule on a small example. 
Example: Let S:�= (A1.B1} wi� m1(A1) =a and 
m1(B1) = 1 • a, ff2 = {A2.B2} wtth m2(A2) = � am 
m2<B2) = 1 -�·Let us assume that A1 "' A2 = 0 :  
A1 (i B1 :�;0; A1 n Bz :�;0; B1 n Bz :�;0; Az n 
B1 :�; 0 : A2 (i Bz * 0. 
Dempster's rule yields m = m 1 $ mz with 
m(At n B2)=a · (1 • �) : m(B1 n A2) = 
1-a·� 
(1-a) . � ; m{Bt (i B2)_(1. a)(l-�) 
1-a·� 1-a·� 
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while the extended Jeffrey's rule gives 
m(Bt n A2l A2) = 1...:..Jl.. = 1 if a :;t: 1 ; 
1 • (X 
m(A1 n B2 I B2) =a; m(B1 (i B2 I B2) = 1 ·a 
and finally 
m(Bt n A2l (fF2.mz)) = �; m(At n Bzl (�z.mz))= 
a(l - p) ; m(B 1 (i B2 1 (fF 2.m2)) = (1 - a)(l - p). 
As it can be seen on this example, and easily 
proved in the general case from (15)-(16), the basic 
probability assignments obtained by Dempster's rule 
and the extended Jeffrey's rule have exactly the same 
focal elements but their weights are different. 
Moreover the extended Jeffrey's rule gives a non­
symmetrical result as expected. When a = 1 this latter 
rule does not apply since then fF 1 = lA1} and one of 
the focal elements of fF2, namely, A2 is such that 
Pl1 (A2) = 0 due to A 1 n A2 = 0. In this case 
Dempster's rule gives m(A l (i �) = 1 whatever the 
value of � (provided that � * 1), i.e. a conclusion 
which is not pervaded with uncertainty in spite of the 
fact we may have a strong conflict between ff 1 and 
fF 2 if� is close to 1 (then 1 -a.� is close to 0). Also 
in the example, the extended Jeffrey's rule looks more 
robust partly because it does not apply when the 
behaviour of Dempster's rule is particularly 
questionable, and also because the normalization is 
performed in a global way in Dempster's rule, while 
in the other case it takes place at the level of each 
focal elements of the body of evidence corresponding 
to the uncertain observation upo n  which we 
conditionalize. 
Figure 1 provides a summary of the relationships 
between the various rules. It is clear that we can 
define a Jeffrey-like extension of the geometric rule 
mentioned above (by substitutin g  in (17) the 
alternative definition of Bel 1 (B I A)), and more 
generally, definitions like (14) or ( 17) are compatible 
with the use of other definitions of conditioning in 
case of a sure observation. 
Exlaldcd 
Jeffrey's rule (14) 
Jeffrey -like 
eJlmSionof 
geometric Nle 
Fiwre 1 : Generalizations of Bayes' rule 
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3 • Updating in possibility theory 
Possibility measures and necessity measures are 
respectively particular cases of plausibility functions 
and belief functions when the focal elements are 
nested. However the linear convex combination of 
possibility measures (or of necessity measures) does 
not yield a possibility measure (or a necessity 
measure) generally (see Dubois & Prade, 1986a). 
Thus the approach presented in the preceding section 
cannot be appl ied to possibility and necessity 
measures for updating them under an uncertain 
observation (expressed in a possibilistic way), if we 
further require that the result be a possibility measure. 
Let us first recall that a possibility measure I1 over .0 
can be defined, through a so-called possibility 
d istributi on 1t, which is a function from .0 to [0,1], 
by the formula (Zadeh, 1978) 
'r/ A!;;;; .0, Il(A) = SUProe A 1t(ro) (19) 
where 1t(ro) estimates to what extent it is possible 
( i.e. compatible w ith w hat is  known) that ro 
corresponds to the true state of the reality in n. In 
other words 7t restricts the more or less possible states 
of the reality given the available incomplete 
information about the reality 7t is supposed to be 
normalized, i.e. 3 ro e n, 7t(ro) = 1 in other words, 
.0 is supposed to be an exhaustive set of alternatives, 
one of which is completely posible. To fl is 
associated a necessity measure N, by duality, namely 
'r/ A�. N(A)=1-Il(A) = infroi! A [1-7t(ro)] (20) 
Recently, it has been shown (Dubois & Prade, 1990) 
that the only way of combining possibility measures 
rr 1• .... Iln into a possibility measure rr. in an 
eventwise manner, was a max-combination of the 
form 
'r/ A, Il(A) = max( f1(I11(A)), ... , fn(Iln(A))) (21) 
where fi is a monotonically increasing function such 
that fi(O) • 0, 'v'i and 3j, fj(l) • 1 which modifies the 
shape of the possibility distribution 7ti underlying IIi· 
An example of admissible possibility consensus 
function is the weighted maximum operation, i.e. 
Il(A) = maxj=l,n min(Aj, Ilj(A)) (22) 
with maxj=1,n 
Aj = 1, where Aj represents the relative 
importance of the source yielding llj (Dubois & 
Prade, 1986c). However, in (22), the minimum can be 
changed into a product, or into the linear operation 
max(O, a + b - 1), and more generally into any 
operation • with 1 • 1=1, 0 • 1 = 0 = 1 • 0, and 
increasing in both places� 
In fact, the weighted max-combination is the 
counterpart in possibility theory of the linear convex 
combination in probability theory ; the weighted 
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max-combination can be interpreted in the 
possibilistic framework just as the convex 
combination can be interpreted in terms of 
probabilistic expectation. This leads to the following 
updating form ula for an a priori possibility 
distr ibution 1t 1 in the face of a new piece of 
information in the form of another possibility 
measure 1t2 . It can be expressed in terms of 
possibility distributions 
(1ttl1t2](ro) = supae (0,1] min(<X,7tl (roiB2a)) (23) 
and in terms of possibility measures 
[fliifl2J(A) = SUPae (0,1] min(<X,I1I(AIB2a.)) (24) 
The observation (per vaded with uncertainty) 
represented by 1t2 is here viewed as a weighted family 
of observations in the usual sense, i.e. the weight a 
reflects to what extent B2a. is an admissible crisp 
representation of the fuzzy set B2 (such that J.Ls2 = 1t2). Namely we have (Zadeh, 1971) 
J.LB2(ro) = supae(0,1] min(<X,J.LB2a.(ro)) (25) 
where B2a is the a-level-cut of B2, namely B2a = 
(ro e .0, Jl�a (ro) � a}. A "sup" in (23)-(24) is used 
since, in the general case, there an infmite number of 
distinct level-cuts B2a. The counterpart of formula 
(24) in terms of necessity measure is 
[N1 II12](A) = 
infa.e(O,l] max(l- a., N1 (A I B2a)) (26) 
In other words {(B2a.,a) I a e (0,1]} can be viewed 
as a basic possibilistic assignment, and a is indeed 
the possibility that the "possibilistic set" attached to 
1t2 , (just as a random set is attached to a basic 
probability assignment) is precisely equal to B2a· It 
is worth noticing that the expressions defining 
[n 1 I 7t2] or CI11 I n2J are integrals in the sense of 
(Sugeno, 1977) when ro or A is fixed, just as Jeffrey's 
rule viewed as an expectation, is an integral in the 
usual sense (in a finite setting). Observe that the rule 
of conditioning gives the maximal importance to the 
core of the fuzzy set B2 (the set of elements with 
membership 1) which, being the smallest level cut, is 
the more informative, and less and less importance 
when level cuts become larger (a.<� � Bza�BzR). 
We have now to give the Bayes-like rufe of 
conditioning in possibility theory, i.e. a possibility 
distribution 7t 1 conditionalized by B results in the 
possibility distribution 7t( · I B), defined in �K:Cordance 
with Dempster rule of conditioning, by 
1t 1 (ro) 
7t(ro I B) = -- if ro e B (27) 
llt(B) 
= 0 otherwise 
where I11(B) = sup00e B 1t1 (ro)and 
ll(AIB)- 1 SUProeA 1tt(ro)-11I(Ar1B) (28) Ili(B) ll1(B) 
together with N(A I B)= 1 - il(A I B). See (Dubois & 
Prade, 1988b) for a discussion of conditioning in 
possibility theory and a justification of this formula. 
Note also that the rule of conditioning in possibility 
theory is a particular case of the more general 
symmetric rule of combination (see Dubois & Prade 
(1988a), Shafer (l987) for instance) 
1t(ro) = 1t1 (ro) * 1t2(ro) (29) 
sup00e .a (1tl (ro) * 1t2(ro)) 
where * is a conjunctive operation which is 
symmetrical, non-decreasing, and such that Vae [0,1], 
a * 1 = a. This rule is the possibilistic counterpart of 
Dempster rule of combination, while (24) plays the 
same role with respect to Jeffrey's updating rule. 
Introducing (27) into (24) leads to the following 
updating formula 
[1t 1 11tz](ro) = 1tt(ro) SUPae (0,1] min( a, fl 1 
CBza) • �'Bza (ro )) (30) 
Observe that when a decreases, 111 (B2a) can only 
1ti(ro) 
increase (since B2a become larger) and thus=---
Ilt<Bza> 
can only decrease. Moreover, �Bz (ro) = I only if 
a S 1t2(ro) and 0 otherwise. Henc� the suprenum in 
(30) is attained for a = 1t2(ro ). The updating fonnula 
can thus be expressed in a more compact way : 
[1ttl1t2](ro) = min(1t2(ro}, 1tl (ro) ) (31) 
llt<B2�(ro)) 
where B21t2(ro) = (ro' 1 1t2(ro ' ) 2: 1tz(ro)}. The effect 
of this updating formula is pictured on Figure 2. 
Fi�MJ<2 
It is worth noticing that [1t1 I 1t2] is normalized as 
soon as the core of 1t2 overlaps the suppon of 1t2 (i.e. 
3 ro e n, 1t2(ro) = 1 and 1t I (ro) > 0). This is 
satisfying ; if it is not the case, it would mean that 
the main pan of B2 focuses on values which are 
completely impossible according to 1t 1 and then the 
conditionalization is debatable. The conditionalization 
becomes completely undefined in case of total 
conflict between 1t2 and 1t 1 (i.e. when it does not 
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exist ro such that 1t1(ro) > 0 and 1tz(ro) > 0). 
Another important propeny is that [1t 1 I 1t2] = 
min(1t 1 ·':2 ) wh�n 
.
the
. 
c�res of 1t 1 and 1t2 are 
overlappmg. Thts IS similar to the coincidence 
between the extended Jeffrey's rule and Dempster rule 
when no normalization factor is necessary in the 
latter. This is well in accordance with the fact that if 
the available information is of the fonn x e A, then 
upon arrival of a sure piece of information x e B, the 
updating process consists in producing x e A n B. 
More generally the denominator IT1(Bz1t (roY in (31) 
helps producing a normalized result on �e basis that 
1t2 is considered as certain, in the spirit of 
conditioning. 
Let us examine the panicular case where 
1tz(ro) = max(J..Ls(ro). A) 
where B is an ordinary subset of .0. Then it means 
that B is completely possible (Ilz(B) = 1) and there is 
a possibility equal to A that the observation is outside 
B (ll2(B) = A). In that case the result of the 
conditionalization of 1t 1 by the uncertain observation 
represented by 1tz is given by 
[1tl 11t2](ro)=max(min(�
1 (ro) ,IJ.B(ro)),min(A,1tl (ro))) 
Tit (B) 
This is illustrated by Figure 3, where we see that in 
that case the result 
A.t---�....; 
o��----��----------------��0 
Figure 3 
is the intersection of 1t 1 and 1t2, which is  
renormalized over the subset B only. As expected, 
[ll1Jll2J(B) = A, a nd the combination is  
dissymetrical ; i t  favors the new information (1t2) 
over the old one. 
4 • Possibility theory and Spohn's ordinal 
conditional functions 
An ordinal conditional function (OCF for shon) is 
a function K from a complete field of propositions 
into the class of ordinals. Here, for simplicity we 
consider a function from a finite Boolean algebra B to 
the set of natural integers n. This Boolean algebra 
consists of a family of subsets of a universe .0 
indo� by a fmite �tion {A1, ... , Am} of n. By 
defininon an OCF verifies the following properties 
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(Spohn, 1988a,b) : 
i) V'i, V'ro, ro' e Aj. K(ro) = K(ro ') 
ii) 3 Ai £:. 0, K(Aj) = 0 
iii) V' A£:. 0, K(A) =min { K(ro) I ro e A}. 
It is easy to see that the set function NK defmed by 
NlC(A) = 1 - e-K(A) is a necessity measure, with 
values in a subset of the unit interval. Moreover 
because K(A) e [N, NK(A) < 1, V' A :t:. 0. The set 
{ K( ro) I ro e n} is the counterpart of a 
possibility distribution 1t on n, such that Il(A) = 
max{1t(ro) I roe A}. Namely, let IlK(A)=l-NK(A)= 
e-K(A), it is easy to check that 1tK(ro) is equal to 
e-K(ro), where 1tK is the possibility distribution 
associated with IlK. K(ro) can be viewed as a degree of 
impossibility of ro, and K(A) = 0 means A is 
completely possible. Since K(ro) e [N, 1tK(ro) > 0 for 
all ro's, i.e. nothing is considered as fully impossible 
in Spohn's approach. 
Spo hn (1988) also introd uces conditioning 
concepts, especially : 
- the A-part of K such that 
V' roE A, K(ro I A) = K(ro) - K(A) (32) 
- the (A,n)-conditionalization of K, say K(ro I (A,n)) 
defined by 
K(ro I (A,n)) = K(ro I A) if ro e A 
= n + K(ro I A) if ro e A (33) 
It is interesting to translate this notion into the 
possibilistic setting. Definitions (32) and (33) 
respectively become 
1tK(ro) . 1tK(ro I A) = -- tf ro e A (34) IlK(A) 
1tK(ro) 
1tK(ro I (A,n)) = if ro e A (35) IlK(A) 
1tK(ro) 
=e-n· -- if ro E A 
IlK( A) 
It is trivial to check that (34) corresponds to 
Dempster rule of conditioning but (35) does not 
correspond to Dempster rule of combination although 
(34) is a particular case of (35) for n � +oo (it says 
then that A is considered as impossible). In fact (34) 
is exactly the Bayes-like conditioning of possibility 
measures, i.e. equation (27). 
In order to compare Spohn's rule to the 
possibilistic updating rule, we let a = e-n and note 
that it comes down to updating a possibility 
distribution 1tL = 1tK on the basis of an uncertain 
observation Il(J\) = a (or equivalently N(A) = 1 - a 
in terms of the degree of certainty). A comparison of 
the two rules is given in Figure 4 for the three 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases A n C = 0, 
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C c A and C overlaps A but is not contained in A, 
where C is the core of 1t 1. 
A 
---.,....._.;A c 
--- 711 Spohn 
7t 2 - Possibilistic Nle 
FiMC4 
Some comments are in order. First, the two rules 
apparently produce very similar results, except that 
S�hn's rule retains the shape of 1t 1 on A more 
fatthfully than the possibilistic rule. The difference 
can be attenuated on the example, by substituting a 
product rule to the minimum rule in (31). However 
the comparison is limited by the fact that the 
possibi listic rule applies in more cases than Spohn's 
rule does. In order to make a more extended 
comparison, Spohn's rule must be generalized to the 
u�tin� of a possibility distribution 1t 1 by another 
distnbuuon 1t2. (34) and (35) can be straightforwardly 
extended to a partition {A1, A2, ... , An} of n, with 
ai = 112(<\) as follows : 
x(roi{(Aj,llj_)li=1,n})=a; · 1tt(ro) forroek i=l,n (36) 
Ilt(Ai) 
l• 
with the condition maxi a.i = 1 (normalization of 
Ih). (34) and (35) are obtained letting A1 =A, a.1 = 
1, A2 = A, a.2 = a.. A special case of (36) is when 
we choose the set of singletons of .Q as the partition, 
and 1t2(ro) instead of the a.i's. Then (36) obviously 
gives 
n(ro ln2) = n2(ro ), 'V ro e .a 
i.e. Spohn's rule comes down to changing 1t 1 into 1t2 
in a systematic way, for all ro such that 1t 1 ( ro) > 0 
(and Spohn's assumptions are such that this is the 
case for all ro e .Q). This is exactly the same as for 
Jeffrey's rule in the probabilistic setting. 
The difference between the two rules becomes 
patent Spohn's rule always strongly accounts for the 
new information, possibly forgetting the old one, 
even if it was more precise (i.e. 1t2 � n1). On the 
contrary the possibilistic rule always tries to 
precisiate the new information by means of the old 
one when it applies. Particularly we have the 
following noticeable property : if nz � 1t 1 then the 
possibilistic rule gives [n1 lnz] = n1 (while Spohn's 
rule prefers n2). Indeed if nz � 1t 1 then 
TI 1 <Bzn2(ro y= 1, 'V ro, in (31 ). Particularly if in the 
above example where TI2(A) =a., if n1 � max(I.1.A,a.) 
then the possibilistic rule would leave 1t 1 unchanged 
because TI1(A) < a., i.e. the input information is too 
weak to question the available knowledge. This 
behavior, i.e. productive updating when the new 
information is not already entailed by the old one is 
very natural since, when n2 � 1t 1, it means that 1t2 
tells the same as n1 but is only weaker. This is 
exactly what happens when in a propositional 
knowledge base a redundant proposition is added. 
Spohn's rule (extended by (36)) violates this 
requirement ; it corresponds to the idea that the new 
information must be kept even if it leads us to forget 
something that is already known. Conversely, if n2 s; 
1t 1, then both rules produce n2 as the updated 
knowledge, because n2 is completely consistent with 
1t 1 but more precise. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have demonstrated that there are 
two kinds  of rules for the combination of 
information : symmetric rules (that combine sources 
in parallel) and dissymmetric rules that correspond to 
the idea of updating. Dempster rule and fuzzy set 
intersections are among the fllSt kind of rules while 
Jeffrey's rule, is of the other kind, as well as the rules 
proposed in this paper for belief functions and 
possibility measures. These two kinds of uncertainty 
measures lead to different updating formulas only for 
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the sake of preserving closure conditions with respect 
to the theories. The difference between the 
possibilistic rule and Spohn's rule has been studied, 
using a scale transformation that changes an ordinal 
conditional function into a possibility measure. This 
examination has pointed out that there may be two 
kinds of updating rules : the ones that preserve the 
available knowledge while possibly refining it, the 
ones that systematically consi der the a priori 
knowledge as being kind of obsolete in the face of 
new information. The possibilistic rule and Spohn's 
rule correspond to the flrst and the second point of 
view respectively. Interestingly Shenoy (1989) has 
recently discussed Spohn's rule in comparison with 
Dempster rule of combination ; our paper and his are 
thus complementary in this respect. 
Lastly the introduced rules have been constructed 
on the basis of analogy with Jeffrey's rule. But the 
latter can be justified in terms of principles of 
minimum change; namely the result of Jeffrey's rule 
is the probability distribution obtained by minimizing 
the relative entropy with respect to the prior 
probability, using the uncertain observations as 
constraints (Domotor, 1985). A further topic of 
research would be to look at information theoretic 
justifications of rules introduced in this paper, 
following the methodology outlined in a previous 
paper (see Dubois & Prade, 1987) , for instance using 
information closeness indices recently introduced by 
Ramer (1989) in the possibilistic setting. 
References 
Aczel J. (1966) Lectures on Functional Equations and 
their Applications. Academic Press, New York. 
Bereinstein C., Kanal L.N., Lavine D. (1986) 
Consensus rules. In : Uncertainty in Artificial 
Intelligence (L.N. Kanal, J.F. Lemmer, eds.), 
North-Holland, Amsterdam, 27 -32. 
Cox R .T .  ( 1946) Probability, fre quency and 
reasonable expectation. American Journal of 
Physics, 14, 1-13. 
De Campos L.M., Lamata M.T., MoralS. (1990) 
The concept of conditional fuzzy measure. To 
appear in Int. J. of Intelligent Systems. 
Domotor Z. (1985) Probability kinematics, 
conditionals, and entropy principles. Synthese, 63, 
75-114. 
Dubois D., Prade H. (1986a) A set-theoretic view of 
belief functions - Logical operations and 
approximations by fuzzy sets. Int. J. of General 
Systems, 12, 193-2 26. 
Dubois D., Prade H. (1986b) On the unicity of 
Demps ter rule of combination. Int. J. of 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Intelligent Systems, 1, 133-142. 
Dubois D., Prade H. (1986c) Weighted minimum and 
maximum operations in fuzzy set theory. 
Infonnation Sciences, 39, 205-210. 
Dubois D., Prade H. (1987) Towards a general 
methodology for belief updating. ?reprints of 2nd 
Inter. Fuzzy Systems Assoc. (IF SA), Tokyo, 
90-93. 
Dubois D., Prade H. (1988a) Representation and 
combination of uncertainty with belief functions 
and possibility measures. Computational 
Intelligence, 4, 244-264 
Dubois D., Prade H. (1988b) The logical view of 
conditioning and its application to possibility and 
evidence theories. In :Tech. Report n° 301, L SI, 
Univ. P. Sabatier, Toulouse, France. Int. J. of 
Approximate Reasoning, 4, 23-46, 1990. 
Dubois D., Prade H. (1990) Aggregation of 
possibility measures. In : Tech. Report IRIT/90-
5/R, I.R.I.T., Univ. P. Sabatier, Toulouse, France. 
To appear in : Multiperson Decision Making 
using Fuzzy Sets and Possibility Theory (J. 
Kacprzylc, M. Fedrizzi, eds.), Kluwer. 
Fagin R., Halpern J.Y. (1989) A new approach to 
updating beliefs. In : Research Report n° RJ 7222 
(67989), IBM Research Division, Almaden 
Research Center, San Jose, Ca., US. 
Goodman I.R., Nguyen H.T. (1985) Uncertainty 
Models for Knowledge-Based Systems. North­
Roland, Amsterdam. 
Ichihashi H., Tanaka H. (1989) Jeffrey-like rules of 
conditioning for the Dempster-Shafer theory of 
evidence. Int. J. of Approximate Reasoning, 3, 
143-156. 
Jeffrey R. (1965) The Logic of Decision. McGraw­
Hill, New York. 
l..ehrer K., Wagner C.G. (1981) Rational Consensus 
in Science and Society. D. Reidel Publ. Co., 
Boston. 
Pearl J. (1988) Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent 
S ystems : Networks of Plausible Inference. 
Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, Ca .. 
Ramer A. (1989) Confluent possibility distributions 
and their representations. Int. J. of General 
Systems, 15,217-231. 
Shafer G. (1976) A Mathematical Theory of Evidence. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Shafer G. (1981) Jeffrey's rule of conditioning. 
Philosophy of Science, 48, 337-362. 
Shafer G. (1987) Belief functions and possibility 
measures. In : Analysis of Fuzzy Information -
Vol. I: Mathematics and Logic (J.C. Bezdek, ed.), 
CRC Press, Boca Raton, Fl., 51-84. 
Shenoy P.P. (1989) On Spohn's rule for revision of 
315 
beliefs. In : Working Paper n° 213, School of 
Business, Univ. of Kansas, Lawrence, USA. 
Smets P. (1988) Belief functions. In : Non-Standard 
Logics for Automated Reasoning (P. Smets, E.H. 
Marndani, D. Dubois, H. Prade, eds.), Academic 
Press, New York, 253-286. 
Smets P. (1990) The combination of evidence in the 
transferable belief model. IEEE Trans. on Pattern 
Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 12(5), 447-
458. 
Spohn W. (1988) A general non-probabilistic theory 
of inductive reasoning. Proc. of the 4th Workshop 
on Uncertainty in  Artificial Intelligence, 
Minneapolis, Minnesota, 315-322. 
Spohn W. (1989) Ordinal conditional functions : a 
dynamic theory of epistemic states. In : Causation 
in Decision, Belief Change and Statistics (W. 
Harper, B. Skyrms, eds.), 105-134. 
Sugeno M. (1977) Fuzzy measures and fuzzy integrals 
-A survey. In: Fuzzy Automatata and Decision 
Process (M.M. Gupta, G.N. Saridis, B.R. Gaines, 
eds.), North-Holland, Amsterdam, 89-102. 
Suppes P., Zanotti M. (1977) On using random 
relations to generate upper and lower probabilities. 
Synthese, 36,427-440. 
Wagner C. (1989) Consensus for belief functions and 
related uncertainty measures. Theory and Decision, 
26, 295-304. 
Zadeh L.A. (1971) Similarity relations and fuzzy 
orderings. Information Sciences, 3, 177-200. 
Zadeh L.A. (1978) Fuzzy sets as a basis for a theory 
of possibility. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 1, 3-28. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Session 7: 
Dempster-Shafer: Graph Decomposition, 
FMT, Interpretations 
A New Approach to Updating Beliefs 
R. Fagin and J. Y. Halpern 
The Transferable Belief Model and Other Interpretations of 
Dempster-Shafer's Model 
P. Smets 
Valuation-Based Systems for Discrete Optimization 
P.P. Shenoy and G.R. Shafer 
Computational Aspects of the Mobius Transform 
R. Kennes and P. Smets 
Using Demster-Shafer Theory in Knowledge Representation 
A. Saffiotti 
